European Pirate Academy

Handbook 3

EUROPEAN PIRATE ACADEMY

The Pirate Academy Handbook

Volume 3: Gas Crisis 2009 — How to run

Facilitator guide for the Tier 2 scenario: the January 2009 Russia–Ukraine gas dispute, played as an emergency conference chaired by the Czech EU Presidency. Internal document — never shared with participants.

The Pirate Academy was made possible by the Greens/EFA group in the European Parliament. The Pirate Academy was created by Paul Diegel and David František Wagner for MEP Markéta Gregorová. This handbook and the revised versions of all scenarios were prepared by David František Wagner.

THE GREENS/EFA in the European Parliament

Disclaimer: Positions in this scenario are fictionalised for educational purposes and inspired by, but not identical to, publicly reported positions. Roles are institutional functions, never named living individuals. Real persons may appear in background context, but nobody plays them. Appendix C separates the historical figures from the numbers invented for playability.

The Volume 3 document set.
This volume is split into practical pieces:

1. **How to run** (this document) — design, history, rules, casting, injects, debrief, templates. *Internal.*

2. **Run-sheet** — a one-page timeline to keep open while running the session. *Internal.*

3. **General factsheet** — the participant-facing briefing, with the key-numbers table and the draft protocol skeleton annexed. *Sent to all participants ~1 week ahead.*

4. **Role handouts** (folder, one document per role, 24 roles) — *each sent individually; a participant sees only their own. Members of the same delegation share the delegation section of their handouts and nothing else.*

Confidentiality follows from the split: everything except the factsheet and a participant's own role handout facilitates exploration and uncertainty through moments of surprise *(more about this design element in Volume 1, Chapter 2).* Publishing the internal documents where future participants can find them would break the scenario. This scenario also has more hidden information than Volume 2, because every multi-member delegation carries scripted internal disagreement.

Chapter 1
Running this scenario

What this is

A single-session negotiation simulation of the first two weeks of January 2009, when a commercial dispute between Gazprom and Naftogaz stopped all Russian gas transit through Ukraine and left south-eastern Europe without heating in mid-winter. Participants play eleven delegations at an emergency conference chaired by the Czech Presidency of the Council: Russia (five roles), Ukraine (three), the Czech Presidency (two), the European Commission (three), and seven member states: Bulgaria, Slovakia, Germany, Italy, Poland, France and the United Kingdom. The goal of the game is to negotiate and sign a protocol that could restore the flow of gas. **Protocol** is very much simplified: five articles with bracketed options. Or to fail, as the real protocol nearly did more than once.

This is the **Tier 2 scenario** of the Pirate Academy sequence (Volume 1, Chapter 2): a larger cast than Volume 2, multi-member delegations whose members carry different and partly conflicting confidential objectives, a qualified-majority rule instead of consensus, a structured output document instead of a free text, and timed news injects grounded in what actually happened. It assumes participants have played one simple scenario (Volume 2 or equivalent) or received an extended rules briefing. It is not recommended to run as a cohort's first simulation.

The scenario's one big idea, which you should hold in your head throughout: **every actor's reasonable position is somebody else's emergency.** Germany's caution, Russia's leverage, Ukraine's sovereignty, Bulgaria's freezing households, the Commission's institutional ambitions and the Presidency's need for a result are all internally coherent

and mutually incompatible. "No agreement" is a valid outcome and a historically plausible one.

What you need

- **Facilitation:** one facilitator minimum; two are strongly recommended (one runs the clock, the shared document and the injects; one watches the negotiation rooms and the delegation channels). The facilitator never participates as a player in the simulation. The Presidency chair is a participant role, which keeps you free to simulate the world.

- **Participants:** 12–24, with **20 as the designed cast** and 24 as the full set. The casting guide (Chapter 5) gives the exact cut order. The scenario is not playable under 12 participants.

- **Time: 90 minutes of play:** two 45-minute blocks with a 10-minute break between them. Add the 10-minute welcome and the 15-minute first-step debrief and the session runs **~125 minutes end to end** (10 + 45 + 10 + 45 + 15). This fits inside a standard ~180-minute course session with room for other content. The full debrief continues at the start of the next course session and through the written reflection.

- **Before the session:** the general factsheet posted ~one week ahead, role-assignment emails, delegation channels open for preparation. Keep the gap at about a week (Volume 1, Chapter 3): this scenario rewards preparation more than Volume 2, and over-preparation by one delegation is a real risk.

- **Platform:** the scenario was designed for and has run **online.** A videoconference platform with breakout capability plus a shared document (the Academy used Discord with Google Docs) is needed. It runs equally well in **person;** Chapter 7.6 gives the variant. The factsheet is written for the online version; adapt its logistics section if you play in a room.

Materials checklist

Before the session you should have prepared:

1. The **general factsheet** (separate document), posted to all participants about one week ahead. The key-numbers table and the **draft protocol skeleton** are annexed to it, so every delegation arrives knowing the shape of the text it will negotiate.

2. Twenty-four **role handouts** (separate documents, one per role), sent individually. Each participant sees only their own. Cut roles per Chapter 5 are simply not sent.

3. Eleven **delegation channels** (Russia, Ukraine, Presidency, Commission, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Germany, Italy, Poland, France, United Kingdom) + European Union Channel (everyone minus Russia and Ukraine) with the right members; a **plenary room;** and three to five (based on the real number of participants) open **negotiation rooms** (name them just "negotiation room1/2/3/4/5", so the participants have to set up their logic themselves).

4. The **shared drafting document** containing the draft protocol skeleton from the factsheet annex. Everyone has an an access to this document and can create their own copies of it.

5. The **run-sheet** (separate document) and the **inject pack** (Chapter 7.3), printed or on a second screen.

6. The **communication templates** (Chapter 8), adapted with your dates and links.

Tech checklist

Run this check before the session — ideally at the end of the previous course session, with everyone present:

- Every participant can join the plenary room, their own delegation channel, and all three negotiation rooms; movement between rooms is unrestricted.
- Every participant has **renamed** their profile to their function (e.g. "Russia - Gazprom Commercial Director", "Bulgaria - Energy Adviser", "Czech Presidency - Chair") and set the delegation's flag or institution logo as avatar. With 24 people moving between rooms, this habit is not cosmetic: it is how everyone knows who just walked in.
- Everyone can open and edit the shared drafting document; it is set to track named edits. Participants are also able to create their own copies of the document.
- The facilitator has a broadcast channel that reaches all rooms at once (time calls and injects) and a private back-channel where any participant can reach the facilitator directly.
- Cameras and microphones tested; participants know to mute in plenary when not speaking.
- The facilitator's timer is visible or announced; a backup facilitator device is logged in.

The week before: prep timeline

When	What
~7 days out	Post the general factsheet; send role-assignment emails (template, Chapter 8); open team channels
~5 days out	Confirm receipt with anyone silent; replace confirmed no-shows using the casting guide's cut order; re-check that Russia's five and Ukraine's three have actually met in their channels
~2 days out	Post the pre-session announcement (template, Chapter 8); run the tech check if not already done
Session day	Rooms open 15 minutes early; facilitator posts the agenda; the Presidency chair briefed on process (Chapter 7.1); the protocol skeleton already sitting in the shared document
After 10–12 January	Post-session message with homework (template, Chapter 8) within 24 hours

Chapter 2
What this scenario teaches

Learning objectives

By the end of the session and its debrief, participants should be able to:

1. **Explain how asymmetric exposure shapes and obstructs a "common European position."** Bulgaria's 96 % dependency and two days of storage against Germany's diversified routes are not two opinions about the same problem; they are two different problems, and the Council rule forces them into one text.

2. **Negotiate on three levels at once:** inside their delegation (whose members want different things), among EU member states (under a qualified-majority rule that makes coalitions count), and between the EU and two external parties who hold the pipeline and the contract.

3. **Produce treaty-style text by working bracketed options under time pressure:** choosing, narrowing and inventing options in a five-article draft, and discovering that a bracket left open is a decision too.

4. **Recognise energy interdependence as an instrument of coercion and of leverage:** for the supplier, for the transit state, and for the customers who lack access to critical energy. Connect the crisis to its real institutional legacy, the EU's security-of-gas-supply legislation, compare it with contemporary energy issues.

5. **Compare their protocol with history:** the real monitoring protocol, its collapse and re-signing, and the 18-19 January deal that actually ended the crisis. After comparing these, participants should be able to rationalise the differences (the final and most important step of the consequentialist model, Volume 1, Chapter 2).

Why the Gas Crisis

January 2009 is close to ideal Tier 2 material. It is dramatic, well documented, and morally uncomfortable: nobody in the room is simply right. It is a crisis in which the EU held **no pipeline, no contract and no legal competence.** Energy was still a largely national matter before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force and had to improvise influence out of convening power, technical expertise and the moral weight of freezing member states. That makes it the cleanest possible lesson in what "EU crisis management" actually consists of when the Union's tools are weak. And its institutional legacy is concrete and traceable: the security-of-supply regulation of 2010, mandatory reverse flows, the N-1 infrastructure standard and the direct legislative outcomes of those thirteen days.

It is also the first scenario in the sequence where **the external parties are full players.** Russia and Ukraine sit at the table, negotiate, make demands and can walk away; the simulation is not "the EU decides what to do" but "everyone in this room tries to find a solution, and not everyone wants the same one."

It also has it´s limits: the EU frame might come off more important than it was at the moment for example. However, these limitations of the model should be reflected after the scenario.

The moment of surprise

Participants arrive expecting a negotiation between the EU and Russia about gas. Some of the scenario's designed surprises are:

- **The EU is not a party.** It cannot sign a supply contract, cannot make Gazprom pump, cannot make Naftogaz open the valves. The room discovers, usually around minute thirty, that the protocol only restores gas if two delegations who despise each other both sign it and that the EU's leverage over either is mostly its ability to make them look bad or direct financial stimulus.

- **The real negotiation is again inside the EU: but now the members are unequal.** In Volume 2 every Council seat held a veto. Here a qualified majority decides, big states weigh more, and the states that are actually freezing are the small ones. The "coalition of the vulnerable" must persuade, not block; Germany and Italy must be seen to help without conceding anything binding. This is the course's first lesson that the Council is not a room of equals.

- **Russia is not a monolith**. Its five roles run on three different clocks: the state is in no hurry, the commercial director bleeds money daily, the pipeline strategist profits from every day of chaos. A cohort that casts and plays this well produces a Russian delegation that argues with itself in private and presents calm authority in public. At the same time, the delegation can easily get into inner conflicts and chaos over objectives and what are they willing to do to achieve them.

- **The technical gas is where the deal dies**. Twenty-one million cubic metres a day of fuel for the compressor stations and the practical questions of who provides it, who pays, how it is metered are a clear technical problem. Historically it was one of the main bottlenecks. The draft protocol makes it Article 2, and the room learns that the small technical article is the one that decides whether anything flows.

These are just samples of possible surprises and what kind of intuitions they can bring to the participants in reflection. The scenario also contains a lot of uncertainty around individual goals and redlines, which are crucial for negotiations.

What this scenario does not do

It does not teach the Council's real voting arithmetic: the simplified rule in Chapter 4 keeps the *dynamic* (small states cannot outvote the big ones; the big ones cannot decide alone) without the numbers. It does not model gas markets: prices in the room are negotiated, not set up by the actual world wide market. It does not attempt to render the humanitarian dimension in south-eastern Europe beyond the inject texts; Serbia, Bosnia and Moldova are deliberately not in the room, and that absence is itself a debrief question. And of course it compresses thirteen days into ninety minutes, simplifying lots of the context.

Chapter 3
The history: facilitator background

This chapter is sourced fact (register 1 of Volume 1, Chapter 2): background you can rely on and share, with sources in Appendix D. Where the scenario departs from it, the departure is flagged; Appendix C lists the numbers that were invented for playability. Participants get a compressed version in the factsheet; this fuller version exists so that you can answer questions with confidence and run the debrief comparison honestly.

The road to 1 January

Russian gas reached Europe in 2009 through three main corridors: the Ukrainian transit system (about 80 % of Gazprom's exports to the EU, roughly 300 million cubic metres a day in winter), the Yamal–Europe pipeline through Belarus and Poland, and the Blue Stream pipeline to Turkey. Russian gas covered roughly a quarter of EU consumption, but very unevenly: Bulgaria, Slovakia and the non-EU Balkan states depended on it almost entirely and received all of it through Ukraine, while Germany, France and the United Kingdom had diversified supplies, alternative routes and deep storage.

The Russia–Ukraine gas relationship had been in dispute since the 2006 cut-off. Ukraine paid a subsidised price ($179.50 per thousand cubic metres in 2008) through an intermediary, **RosUkrEnergo** (RUE), half-owned by Gazprom and half by Ukrainian private interests, which had become politically toxic in Kyiv. In October 2008 the two prime ministers agreed

in principle on a three-year transition to European price levels and on eliminating the intermediary; the contract talks that followed collapsed at the end of December over two things: the **price** for 2009 (Gazprom's last pre-crisis offer was around $250; Ukraine's counter-offers ran from about $201 to $235; after the cut-off Gazprom's demand rose to $418 and then $450) and **debt** (Gazprom claimed roughly $2 billion in arrears and penalties; Naftogaz paid $1.5 billion for gas on 30 December and disputed the remaining penalties, a little over $600 million). Both sides were also weakened by the global financial crisis: Ukraine had taken an IMF programme in November 2008 and Naftogaz sold gas domestically far below cost; Gazprom's European revenues were its lifeline.

Thirteen days in real history

Date (2009)	What happened
1 January	Gazprom stops the volumes intended for Ukrainian consumption; transit to Europe continues. Both sides start accusing each other of taking "technical gas" (the gas that fuels the compressor stations) and of siphoning transit volumes.
5–6 January	Moscow orders transit cut by the amount it says Ukraine has taken; deliveries to Europe fall sharply. Slovakia declares a state of energy emergency (6 January).

Date (2009)	What happened
7 January	All Russian gas transit through Ukraine stops. Some eighteen European countries are affected. Bulgaria shuts industrial plants and closes schools; Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia, with little or no storage, lose district heating in sub-zero temperatures. Each side blames the other for closing the last valve.
8 January	Talks in Brussels convened by the Commission and the Czech Presidency: the idea of an independent monitoring mission at the metering stations on both sides of the border is accepted in principle. The EU's Gas Coordination Group works on reverse flows and storage releases among member states.
10–12 January	The monitoring protocol is signed in Moscow (10 January) and in Kyiv (11 January) — but Ukraine attaches a handwritten declaration asserting that it has taken no gas and owes no debt; Moscow declares the document void. The declaration is dropped and the protocol re-signed on 12 January.

Date (2009)	What happened
10–12 January	Monitors from the Commission, member states and European gas companies deploy. Meanwhile Slovakia announces it will restart a nuclear unit at Bohunice closed under its EU accession treaty, and Bulgaria asks about reopening two units at Kozloduy — both requests collide with EU law and are abandoned once gas returns.
13 January	Gazprom nominates a restart through the Sudzha entry point, routed towards the Balkans; Ukraine refuses the route, saying it cannot be run without cutting supply to its own eastern regions and without technical gas. Transit remains at zero. The monitoring mission, fully deployed, has nothing to monitor
15 January	European gas companies (ENI, E.ON Ruhrgas, GDF Suez among them) float a consortium that would buy the technical gas needed to restart transit — the face-saving commercial idea nobody had asked the EU to sponsor.

Date (2009)	What happened
17–19 January	A Moscow "gas summit" convened by Russia attracts little senior European attendance. The crisis ends bilaterally: a political agreement between the two prime ministers on 18 January, ten-year Gazprom–Naftogaz supply and transit contracts signed on 19 January.
20 January	Transit resumes; flows are back to normal within days.

What the real deal said

The essentials for the debrief comparison (a crib table is in Appendix B):

- **Price**: a European netback formula, with a 20 % discount for 2009 only (about $360 for the first quarter of 2009), full European level from 2010. This was far above Ukraine's public ceiling and well above what Gazprom had first offered in December.
- **Transit:** the 2009 transit tariff unchanged; European-level tariffs from 2010.
- **The intermediary:** RosUkrEnergo eliminated; direct Gazprom–Naftogaz contracts.
- **Debt:** handled outside the headline agreement, through a set of side transactions that were still being litigated years later.
- **Take-or-pay** and penalty clauses that would generate the next disputes. The 2009 contracts were the object of arbitration until 2018.

- **What the EU got:** its monitoring mission: which deployed, worked, and did not restart the gas. The decisive negotiation happened between Moscow and Kyiv; the EU's role was to make bilateral failure unbearable rather than to broker the terms.

The aftermath belongs to the debrief too. Within the EU the crisis produced **Regulation (EU) 994/2010 on security of gas supply** — mandatory reverse-flow capability on cross-border interconnectors, the N-1 infrastructure standard, national preventive and emergency plans, a supply standard for protected customers — later replaced and strengthened by Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 with its solidarity mechanism. It accelerated interconnectors and LNG terminals in Central and south-eastern Europe. It did not stop Nord Stream (commissioned 2011–2012); South Stream was abandoned in 2014 for other reasons. Both bypass projects were argued for, in January 2009, with exactly the sentences your Russian pipeline strategist will use.

The five contested articles

Nearly everything the room will fight about falls into the five articles of the draft protocol.

1. **The monitoring mission** (Art. 1). Who monitors (EU officials only, EU plus industry experts, or a mixed Russian–Ukrainian–EU team), with what access, at which stations, for how long. Historically the easiest article (both sides accepted monitors quickly) and the one participants often spend the most time on because it feels like "the EU's article."

2. **Technical gas** (Art. 2). About 21 million cubic metres a day to run the compressors. Free from Gazprom as a condition of transit? Bought by Naftogaz at an interim price? Financed by the EU? By a consortium of European companies? This was the real bottleneck, and it is the article where the Commission's one financial instrument (Chapter 4) matters.

3. **Conditions for resumption** (Art. 3). Within how many hours of signature, and conditional on what should the service resume. Unconditional, on a pricing framework, on the mission being deployed, on debt acknowledgement…? The article where Russia and Ukraine trade sequencing.

4. **The pricing framework** (Art. 4). An interim price, a commitment to conclude a long-term contract within a set period, or (the historically accurate option) deferral to bilateral talks with no EU involvement at all. Russia's red line is that the EU has nothing to say here; watch how the room treats a bracket that says "not addressed in this protocol."

5. **Debt** (Art. 5). Acknowledged, settled, referred to Stockholm arbitration, or left out. The article where confidential information (Russia's own doubts about its penalty claims) is most valuable.

A sixth, unwritten fight runs across all five: **EU solidarity.** Reverse flows, storage releases, binding sharing obligations, compensations…the vulnerable states will try to write into the protocol and the big states will probaly try to keep out of a document about Russia and Ukraine. Let them fight about where it belongs; historically it belonged in EU legislation less than two years later.

Where the scenario bends history

Keep the register boundaries explicit (Volume 1, Chapter 2). The main fictionalisations, all to be named in the debrief:

- **The format:** one emergency conference with Russia, Ukraine, the Commission, the Presidency and seven member states at one table. Historically the talks were a shifting sequence of bilateral and trilateral meetings in Brussels, Moscow and Kyiv, and the Council's own deliberations happened elsewhere. The conference is the pedagogical device that puts the EU's internal negotiation and its external one in the same room.

- **The cast:** seven member states chosen to span the exposure spectrum. Two freezing (Bulgaria, Slovakia), one hawkish (Poland), two commercially entangled (Germany, Italy), two insulated (France, the United Kingdom) plus the Czech Presidency. Austria, Hungary, Greece and Romania mattered in reality and are absent; the Commission's confidential dataset mentions them.

- **The decision rules:** simplified qualified majority instead of the Nice weights; the Commission's support/sabotage vote; the internal majorities inside Russia and Ukraine. All three are register 3: game mechanics, invented to make the institutional dynamics playable (Chapter 4).

- **The compression:** thirteen days become ninety minutes; the injects deliver events out of their real sequence, tuned to the room's needs rather than the calendar.

Chapter 4
Rules and mechanics

The cast

Delegation	Roles	Internal decision rule
Russian Federation (5)	Senior Government Representative; Gazprom Commercial Director; Gazprom Pipeline Strategy Representative; Government Energy Policy Adviser; Strategic Outreach Adviser	Simple majority (3 of 5); the Government Representative speaks for the delegation
Ukraine (3)	Government Representative; Naftogaz Representative; Strategic Adviser	Simple majority (2 of 3); the Government Representative speaks for the delegation
Czech EU Presidency (2)	Presidency Representative (chair); Energy and Industry Adviser	Chairs and mediates; no vote; signs on the Council's behalf once the Council has a common position

Delegation	Roles	Internal decision rule
European Commission (3)	President's Representative; Energy Commissioner's Representative; External Relations Representative	No vote during negotiation; unanimous sign-off on the financial instrument; final support/sabotage vote by majority (2 of 3)
Council: member states (7 delegations, 11 roles)	Bulgaria (National Representative, Energy Adviser); Slovakia (National Representative, Energy Adviser); Germany (National Representative, Energy Adviser); Italy (National Representative, Energy Adviser); Poland; France; United Kingdom	One vote per state, cast by the National Representative; common position by simplified qualified majority (below)

The United Kingdom is a member state - the scenario is set in 2009.

The decision rules

The protocol is **concluded** when all of the following hold, in this order:

1. **Russia signs.** The Russian delegation votes internally; three of five carry. (Historically honest in spirit: the Russian state decided, and Gazprom's commercial anxieties were an input, not a veto.)

2. **Ukraine signs.** Two of three carry — which means the Naftogaz Representative and the Strategic Adviser can outvote the Government Representative, and the Government Representative knows it.

3. **The Council adopts a common position endorsing the text by simplified qualified majority: at least five of the seven member states, including at least two of Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom.** Each state's National Representative declares on the record; the Presidency counts and, if the threshold is met, signs on the Council's behalf. *(Design note: the rule preserves the real dynamic — the three small states cannot carry a position without at least two big ones, and the four big states cannot carry one alone — without the Nice arithmetic. Chapter 5 gives the thresholds for smaller casts. If you prefer realism, use the Lisbon double majority, 55 % of states and 65 % of population: an anachronism for 2009, but a teachable one, and be ready to do the arithmetic live.)*

4. **The Commission votes last: support or sabotage**. The Commission does not vote during the negotiation; it drafts, brokers and holds one financial instrument (below). After Russia, Ukraine and the Council have declared, the three Commission members caucus for sixty seconds and vote by majority. Support means the Commission signs and deploys the monitoring mission; sabotage means it declares that it will not deploy or finance anything under this text. A sabotaged protocol is signed paper without a Comission support: an outcome the room must live with and the debrief must weigh. Just to be clear - it can be fully workable even without the Commission support.

Announce this rule in the welcome so that the member states know the Commission should be kept on board; it is the Commission's lever against a deal that ignores the European interest. However, make sure everybody understands that this is a mechanism representing some more complex inner workings of the whole Union AND that the protocol might be working great even without Commission support.

All outcomes, including Russia or Ukraine walks, the Council falls short of the threshold, the Commission sabotages… produces a **partial or no-deal outcome,** each of which is legitimate and debriefable (see "What counts as an outcome").

Side agreements (a bilateral German–Russian understanding, a Bulgarian emergency arrangement, a trilateral pipeline declaration…) are allowed and encouraged; they should be written and have clear support of the stakeholders, but need to be published only after the scenario. It is fully possible that somebody will go for a backroom deal.

The Commission's financial instrument

The Commission may offer **EU financing in exactly one article** of the protocol and only if **all three Commission members sign off** inside the delegation. This is the Commission's one bullet. It makes the Commission's internal alignment a mini-negotiation of its own (the three briefs disagree about what the money is for), and it gives the Commission something to withhold. Financing offered in a second article is not possible. This is once again an in game simplification, but following a simple, real principle: financing and administrative possibilities are limited.

The Commission also **brokers solidarity measures** among member states (reverse flows, storage releases) but does not own them: a German storage release exists only if Germany agrees to it in writing. Watch member states trying to outsource solidarity to the Commission; the Presidency's job is to send the question back. The Commission does not have resources to provide this kind of solidarity (filling Balkan gas storage for example).

The working documents

Ideally, the scenario produces its output artifact:a signed or unsigned protocol. The protocol goes through four layers of paper:

1. **The draft protocol skeleton** (public from the start: annexed to the factsheet). Five articles, each with a menu of bracketed options and a blank for "another arrangement." Every delegation arrives knowing the shape of the text; the brackets are a starting menu, not a cage, and delegations may write new options at any time.

2. **Delegation mandates** (the preparation week and Block 1, private). Each delegation agrees, in its channel, its opening position, its red lines and who covers what. Never collected or graded; their function is to force delegations to know what they want before they meet anyone. Russia's five and Ukraine's three will discover during this step that they do not entirely agree with each other: which is the design. I**t is your design decision to push participants to create mandates.** Usually it is better to nudge them into the exercise, but other solutions are also possible (for example nudging just part of participants to have ready mandates). In some cases, you might also want to use Gas Crisis scenario to let participants experience negotiation without prepared mandates and then let them prepare mandates for some later scenario in the cycle.

3. **The Presidency text** (the break, public). During the break the Presidency and the Commission post the skeleton into the shared document with the options **narrowed** or extended from what they heard in Block 1 — struck options, new options, a note on where the fault lines are. It is the Volume 2 Draft Framework with a stronger scaffold: one page, imperfect, and it exists.

4. **The final text** (Block 2, public). The shared document, worked over in the negotiation rooms, narrowed in the endgame plenary, and put to the vote. Only unbracketed text is voted on; an option left in brackets is not agreed: and "not addressed in this protocol" is itself an option, historically the correct one for two of the five articles.

The phase structure

Two 45-minute blocks with a 10-minute break (the full timeline is in the se-parate run-sheet):

- **Block 1 The Disruption**

  The Presidency opens with the situation report; a chaired plenary hears **45-second opening statements** per delegation; the negotiation rooms open for a first round; the Presidency closes the block with a state-of-play summary that names the distances between positions aloud.

- **The break**. The Presidency and the Commission post the Presidency text; the primary inject (D1) fires as people return.

- **Block 2 — Negotiating the Protocol.**

  The Presidency frames the text; article-by-article negotiation in the rooms under the pressure of the inject, with conditional injects available; an endgame plenary in which the Presidency **triages** to the two decisive articles; the vote; one closing sentence per delegation in role.

The injects

The scenario's steering wheel (Volume 1, Chapter 5): one primary inject that always fires at the break, and four conditional injects for Block 2, all grounded in documented events of 6–15 January 2009 and delivered as written news flashes in the broadcast channel (full texts, purposes and firing conditions in Chapter 7.3). The facilitator's judgment call is *when,* never *what*; at most two conditional injects per run; none after the endgame plenary has begun. There is no drawn random element in this scenario. The randomnes this scenario adds is the internal disagreement of the delegations, where we cannot predict results of the disagreements.

What counts as an outcome

Every terminal state is playable and debriefable:

- **A full protocol:** Russia, Ukraine and the Council sign; the Commission supports. The room brokered in ninety minutes what reality needed two more weeks and a Moscow summit to achieve; the debrief compares the text with the real monitoring protocol *and* with the 18–19 January deal, and asks what the room traded away to get there.

- **A protocol without Russia, or without Ukraine:** a piece of paper without gas. Instructive: what is a protocol worth when the party holding the valve, or the pipeline, is not on it?

- **A protocol the Council could not endorse:** Russia and Ukraine agree, the EU splits. The debrief pivots to which big state withheld its vote and what it would have cost to bring it in. Also different bilateral agreements can be pointed out.

- **A sabotaged protocol:** signed by all, disowned by the Commission. Institutional interest against an intergovernmental bargain; the debrief writes itself.

- **No text worth voting on:** deadlock, historically plausible. Debrief which article killed it and who in the room quietly preferred failure (the reveal, Chapter 7.5, will tell them).

- **Side agreements without a protocol:** a German–Russian understanding, an Italian consortium, a Bulgarian emergency arrangement, and no common text. The most realistic failure of all: the EU picked off one by one. Debrief exactly that.

Chapter 5
Casting guide

Casting is a pedagogical act, not an administrative one (Volume 1, Chapter 5). This chapter rates every role, gives the cut order for cast sizes 12–24, and flags the friction and comeback structure. Two things make casting harder here than in Volume 2: seven of the twenty-four roles carry **scripted dissent against their own delegation lead,** and must go to participants who will actually push back. Two roles (Germany's National Representative and the United Kingdom) are **defensibly unpopular**, and must go to participants who can hold a line without needing the room's approval.

The casting notes are recommendations: however, sometimes it is useful to try to give for example speaking heavy roles to participants who are a bit more shy. If you give them enough support and you do not assign ALL speaking heavy roles to more silent participants the scenario will be fine and you will allow some crucial space for experimentation and play outside of the comfort zone.

Role ratings

Speaking demand is plenary exposure; drafting demand is written work under time pressure; *roaming* roles are designed to be away from their delegation's table most of the time and suit restless, social participants.

Role	Speaking	Drafting	Casting notes
Czech Presidency: Presidency Representative (chair)	Very high	Medium	Chairs everything: opens, summarises, triages, runs the vote. Your most confident, organised participant. A dominant speaker who cannot summarise others will sink the session. In small cohorts, consider a second facilitator here. The premier stretch role.
Czech Presidency: Energy and Industry Adviser	Medium	Very high	Holds both the technical know how and has a space and great position to help with the actual drafting.
Commission: President's Representative	High	Medium	The Commission's political voice; carries the institution's long game (reform, credit). Suits a participant who can be "the reasonable adult" without becoming the chair.

Role	Speaking	Drafting	Casting notes
Commission: Energy Commissioner's Representative	Medium	High	Holds the vulnerability data and the technical-gas formula; the room's engineer. Second-best home for a well-prepared quiet participant.
Commission: External Relations Representative	Medium	Medium	The Commission's diplomat; sees that the real problem is the member states. First Commission role to cut.
Russia: Senior Government Representative	High	Low	Calm authority, in no hurry; must manage four colleagues with other agendas. Needs presence and patience — and the nerve to say no to a good deal.
Russia: Gazprom Commercial Director	High	Medium	Wants the deal, bleeds money daily, scripted to disagree with the state. Cast someone who will genuinely push back inside the delegation.
Russia: Gazprom Pipeline Strategy Representative	Medium	Low	Roaming. Works Germany, Italy and Bulgaria on bypass pipelines; profits from delay. Suits a persuasive one-to-one talker.

Role	Speaking	Drafting	Casting notes
Russia: Government Energy Policy Adviser	Medium	Medium	Debt and RosUkrEnergo; the delegation's problem-solver with the Commission. Rewards preparation.
Russia: Strategic Outreach Adviser	Medium	Low	Roaming. Eyes and ears; privately thinks the delegation is overplaying. Good first Tier 2 role for a social participant.
Ukraine: Government Representative	High	Low	Principled, vocal, trapped by its own public price ceiling. Needs someone comfortable being outvoted by their own team.
Ukraine: Naftogaz Representative	High	High	The commercial negotiator opposite Gazprom; has more flexibility than the government admits. Heavy role: numbers, text and a scripted internal conflict.
Ukraine: Strategic Adviser	Medium	Low	Roaming. Builds the European coalition, mediates inside the delegation, holds the most uncomfortable confidential knowledge. Suits a diplomat.

Role	Speaking	Drafting	Casting notes
Bulgaria: National Representative	High	Low	Scripted to be emotional in plenary — the room's moral megaphone. A strong card for a participant with medium confidence but real presence. Tempted by a bilateral deal with Russia.
Bulgaria: Energy Adviser	Medium	Medium	The data voice; counsels against the bilateral temptation. Pairs with Slovakia's adviser.
Slovakia: National Representative	High	Low	Declared an emergency, demands compensation, wants to confront Germany. Cast someone who enjoys being loud on purpose.
Slovakia: Energy Adviser	Medium	High	The constructive problem-solver of the vulnerable coalition; drafts solidarity language. Good quiet-participant role with a real path to influence.
Germany: National Representative	Medium	Low	Cautious, commercial, morally uncomfortable; must protect Nord Stream while Bulgaria freezes. The scenario's hardest "defensible but unpopular" seat — cast for steadiness.

Role	Speaking	Drafting	Casting notes
Germany: Energy Adviser	Low–medium	Medium	The "reasonable German," privately in favour of a modest gesture. Boxed-out risk if the National Representative freezes them out — see below.
Italy: National Representative	Medium	Low	Commercial pragmatist, Germany's natural ally, South Stream partner. A warm persuader does well.
Italy: Energy Adviser	Low–medium	Medium	Holds the consortium idea — the scenario's designed unlock for Article 2. Boxed-out risk until that moment; comeback built in.
Poland	High	Low	Solo. Righteous, not angry; builds the vulnerable coalition and chooses when to name Germany. Cast a participant who can be principled without hectoring.
France	Medium	Medium	Solo. The swing vote, insulated and knows it; leads by synthesis. Suits a listener who speaks late and well. Drifts if unprompted.

Role	Speaking	Drafting	Casting notes
United Kingdom	Low–medium	Low	Solo. Market liberal, barely affected, must sound principled rather than heartless. The lightest role in the cast — first to cut. Drifts if unprompted.

Cast sizes 12–24

The full set is 24; the designed cast is 20. Adjust in this order. Each step is independent and reversible at a week's notice (Volume 1, Chapter 4). Cut roles are simply not sent; where a brief is *folded*, hand its confidential paragraph to the named colleague. This is a recommended simple cut, however, as always, your teaching needs might justify other solutions.

- **23:** cut the **United Kingdom**. Six voting states; France becomes the only insulated voice.

- **22:** cut **Italy: Energy Adviser**; fold the consortium idea into Italy's National Representative.

- **21:** cut **Germany: Energy Adviser;** fold the storage-gesture knowledge into Germany's National Representative. They will be less inclined to use it, but that is fine.

- **20 (designed cast):** cut **Russia: Strategic Outreach Adviser.** Russia now has four; the "overplaying our hand" voice moves to the Gazprom Commercial Director, who already holds half of it.

- **19:** cut **Russia: Government Energy Policy Adviser;** fold the debt and RosUkrEnergo portfolio into the Gazprom Commercial Director. This might make Russia a bit less capable of bilateral deals, be sure to check in with them and prompt them into bilaterals as an option.

- **18:** cut **Commission: External Relations Representative.** The Commission's financial instrument now needs both remaining members.

- **17:** cut **Ukraine: Strategic Adviser.** Ukraine's internal rule becomes "both must agree". Tell them; the Government Representative's price trap now bites harder.

- **16:** cut **Bulgaria: Energy Adviser** *or* **Slovakia: Energy Adviser.** The goal is to keep one vulnerable-state adviser in the game, and prefer to keep Slovakia's (the drafter).

- **15:** cut **Czech Presidency: Energy and Industry Adviser;** this weakens the chair and they lose the drafting support.

- **14**: cut **Russia: Gazprom Pipeline Strategy Representative;** the bypass-pipeline subplot shrinks mostly to Germany's and Italy's own briefs who now need to reach out to Russia. Russia is now three: state, commercial, and whichever adviser survived. Its consensus rule becomes 2 of 3.

- **13:** cut the remaining vulnerable-state adviser.

- **12 (floor)**: cut **Russia's remaining adviser;** Russia has two remaining players, state and Gazprom, and must agree. The floor configuration: Russia 2, Ukraine 2, Presidency 1, Commission 2, Bulgaria 1, Slovakia 1, Germany 1, Italy 1, Poland 1, France 1. All seven articles of tension survive; the roaming subplots do not.

- **Below 12**, run different scenario. Above 24, do not enlarge; split the cohort and run two parallel games: the scenario parallelises cleanly, and two rooms reaching two different protocols make an excellent joint debrief.

Council thresholds at smaller casts. State the rule in the welcome for the cast you actually have:

Voting member states	Needed for a common position	Of which from Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom
7	5	at least 2
6 (no UK)	4	at least 2
5 (no UK, no Italy — emergency only)	4	at least 1

Do not cut a whole member state before Italy's adviser, Germany's adviser and the Russian advisers are gone.

No-shows on the day: an adviser's brief folds into their delegation lead (hand over the confidential paragraph); a missing solo state is "absent from the table" and the threshold drops per the table above; a missing Commission member is absorbed by the Energy Commissioner's Representative. Three roles cannot be absorbed: the Presidency chair, the R**ussian Government Representative** and the **Ukrainian Government Representative.**

Cast reliable participants there and know your emergency replacements: if the CZ presidency is missing, promote the Presidency adviser to the chair etc.

Friction, boxed-out risks, and comeback moments

Cast friction consciously

(see Volume 1, Chapter 5)

The key oppositions: Russia's state–Gazprom clock (patience against quarterly earnings), Ukraine's government–Naftogaz price gap, Bulgaria's two members (bilateral temptation against EU discipline), Poland–Germany on Nord Stream, and Presidency chair–Presidency adviser on ambition. Do not put your two most harmonious friends on the two Russian leads, or on Ukraine's government and Naftogaz seats; the scenario needs those pairs to be able to disagree in private and still present one face in public.

Risks of zoning out

Four seats drift: the **United Kingdom** and **France** (insulated, solo, nothing at stake unless prompted), **Germany's Energy Adviser** (a cautious lead can freeze them out entirely) and **Italy's Energy Adviser** (waiting for the consortium moment). All four have designed comebacks: the Council vote (where two of the four big states must say yes) makes France and the UK decisive in the last ten minutes; inject D2 hands Italy's adviser the floor; and any solidarity proposal the Presidency puts to Germany can be routed to the adviser ("Germany, can your energy expert tell us what your storage could actually do?"). If a checked-out participant is visibly checked out before their moment arrives, route a task through the game (Volume 1, Chapter 5): the Presidency can ask France to draft the solidarity paragraph, or a capital can instruct the UK to demand a market-based clause.

Rotation note. The two advisers of Germany and Italy, the UK, and the Commission's External Relations seat are this scenario's low-exposure roles. Track who plays them: the same participant should not sit in low-exposure roles again in Volume 4 (Volume 1, Chapter 5).

Chapter 6
The handout set: who gets what

Distribution map for the participant-facing documents (all in the Volume 3 folder):

Document	Goes to	When
General factsheet (incl. key-numbers table and draft protocol skeleton)	Everyone	~7 days out, posted publicly
Role handout — one per role	Only the assigned participant (via the role email, Chapter 8)	~7 days out, individually

Each role handout contains the **delegation section** (shared word for word by every member of that delegation: context, key facts, decision rule) plus the **individual brief**: motivations and constraints, red lines, style and a clearly marked **confidential** paragraph that is for that participant alone, *not for their delegation*. This is the Tier 2 difference from Volume 2: in Volume 2, confidential angles were mostly about the room; here they are about the participant's own colleagues. Say so in the role email, and never circulate one member's handout to another. Russia's Government Representative must not read the Gazprom Commercial Director's brief. Member states in the Council are separate delegations; their handouts share only the paragraph on the Council's decision rule.

Chapter 7
Facilitator guide

This chapter applies the craft principles of Volume 1, Chapter 5, with this scenario's concrete numbers, texts and timings.

7.1 Before the session

Casting done per Chapter 5; factsheet posted and role emails sent ~7 days out; delegation channels open. During the preparation week, watch the channels lightly: you are checking that every delegation is alive, and specifically that Russia's five have divided the room among themselves: a Russian delegation that arrives as a huddle plays as a monolith, is not able to work on the bilaterals and splitting Europe and the scenario loses its best mechanism.

Prepare the shared drafting document with the protocol skeleton in it (copy the factsheet annex), edit rights for all. If this freedom is getting to problematic for your participants, set up clearly who is the final penholder (CZ Energy Adviser is well positioned for this role). Prepare the inject pack (Chapter 7.3) in a document you can paste from.

Ask the participant playing the **Presidency chair** to arrive 15 minutes early: walk them through the session flow and confirm they understand the chair's toolkit: opening statement order, calling plenaries, the state-of-play summary at the end of Block 1, the break task (Presidency text with the Commission), the endgame triage, and the vote sequence. Do not coach them on outcomes, only on process. Tell them plainly that they will not get a real break; their adviser and the Commission draft with them. Five minutes here saves fifteen later.

7.2 The timeline

The minute-by-minute timeline lives in the separate **run-sheet**; keep it open.

The shape: 10′ welcome and etiquette →

Block 1 (45′): situation report, huddles, 45-second opening statements, first negotiation round, state-of-play plenary → break (10′): Presidency text posted, **D1 fires** as people return →

Block 2 (45′): framing, article negotiation with conditional injects, endgame plenary with triage, the vote, closing sentences → first-step debrief (15′).

In the endgame plenary the chair **triages**: reads the current text, names what is still bracketed, and picks the **decisive articles** (almost always Articles 2 and 3) for focused, moderated resolution. Everything else stays as it is: bracketed means not agreed, and "not addressed in this protocol" is a legitimate final state for Articles 4 and 5 (it was the real one).

The vote sequence (formal, slightly ceremonial, never mumbled: it is the designed key moment for nearly every participant): the chair reads the unbracketed text → Russia declares (its lead announces the delegation's decision; you may ask for the internal count) → Ukraine declares → the Council: each National Representative on the record, one by one; the chair counts against the threshold → the Commission caucuses for sixty seconds and declares support or sabotage → the chair announces the outcome in one sentence.

Never cut: the etiquette briefing, the state-of-play plenary at the end of Block 1, Block 2's endgame plenary, the vote, and debrief steps 1–2. If you lose the clock, compress Block 1's huddle to five minutes and the opening statements to thirty seconds each before touching anything else; then shorten Block 2's article negotiation; then drop the closing sentences.

7.3 The inject pack

All injects are written news flashes posted to the broadcast channel (reading them aloud is allowed but costs negotiation time). Historical grounding is noted in italics; the texts are fictionalised in register 2 (Volume 1, Chapter 2). Inject discipline: post word for word; never improvise volumes or casualty numbers; one inject at a time; a good inject provokes re-evaluation, not chaos. **At most two conditional injects per run; none after the endgame plenary has begun.**

D1 — PRIMARY, fixed, as people return from the break: "Europe in the cold."
Grounded in 6–7 January: the complete transit stop and its effects in Bulgaria, Slovakia and the Western Balkans.

BREAKING — 7 January. All Russian gas transit through Ukraine has stopped as of this morning. Moscow and Kyiv each accuse the other of closing the valves. Bulgaria reports industrial plants shutting down and schools closing; Sofia's district heating has days of reserves. Slovakia has declared a state of emergency. In Sarajevo, electric heaters sold out within hours; tens of thousands of households have lost district heating in −7 °C. The Red Cross speaks of a developing humanitarian emergency in the Balkans.

Purpose: convert Block 1's positioning into Block 2's urgency; hand Bulgaria and Slovakia the moral megaphone. Fire always. Give delegations two minutes to absorb it before the chair frames the text.

D2 — CONDITIONAL, Block 2: "The consortium."
Grounded in 15 January: European gas companies' proposal to buy the technical gas. Fire if Article 2 deadlocks, or if the EU has split into blocs and needs a bridge. Skip if Italy's Energy Adviser has already pitched the idea, it is in their confidential card.

NEWS FLASH — Reuters. The chief executives of several European energy companies — ENI, E.ON Ruhrgas and GDF Suez among them — are discussing a consortium that would purchase the "technical gas" needed to restart the Ukrainian transit system, ending the dispute over who pays for it. Neither Gazprom nor Naftogaz has commented.

Purpose: unlocks Article 2 with a face-saving option for both Russia and Ukraine; gives Italy's adviser the floor.

D3 — CONDITIONAL, Block 2: "The nuclear option."
Grounded in 10–11 January: Slovakia's announced restart of a Bohunice unit and Bulgaria's request on Kozloduy. Fire to sharpen the solidarity debate, or to give a sidelined Slovakia or Bulgaria a comeback moment.

NEWS FLASH — Bratislava. The Slovak government has ordered preparations to restart the Bohunice V1 nuclear unit — closed on the last day of 2008 as a condition of Slovakia's EU accession treaty. Bulgaria's president has raised restarting two units at Kozloduy. The Commission's lawyers note that both moves would breach EU law. Both governments answer: our citizens are freezing.

Purpose: forces the room to weigh legal order against emergency. The Commission must respond, and the vulnerable coalition gains leverage.

D5 — CONDITIONAL, Block 2: "The failed restart."
Grounded in 13 January: Gazprom's nominated restart via Sudzha and Ukraine's refusal of the route. Fire if the room treats a signed Article 3 as the end of the story with more than ten minutes of negotiation left — or as the alter-native to D3.

NEWS FLASH. Gazprom says it has resumed pumping gas into the Ukrainian system at the Sudzha entry point, routed towards the Balkans. Naftogaz says the route cannot be operated without cutting supply to Ukraine's eastern regions and without technical gas it does not have. Monitors at the border confirm: no gas has crossed. The mission is fully deployed and has nothing to monitor.

Purpose: shows that a signed protocol restarts nothing until Article 2 is actually solved; sends the room back to the technical gas with the clock running.

7.4 Running notes by block

These are maximalist running notes if you want to have a fuller control of the scenario. It is fully possible to also mostly let it run. When in doubt, consider that too active intervention is also a failure.

Block 1. The huddle is short because the delegations have had a week; use it to visit Russia and Ukraine once each and check that they have divided the room. If five Russians are sitting in one channel planning to move as a group, ask their lead some leading questions ("Who is with Germany right now?") and leave. Hold the **45-second rule** in the opening plenary; eleven delegations at 45 seconds is nine minutes, and the room learns from the first enforcement. Suggested order: Ukraine, Russia, then member states from most to least affected, the Commission last, the chair never. When the rooms open, expect chaotic minutes: that is the design. Watchpoints: by ~0:40, Russia and Ukraine should have had first contact. If not, have the chair invite them to state positions in a mini-plenary. Bulgaria and Slovakia should be loud by design; if they are not, D1 will fix it. The state-of-play plenary at 0:50 is a critical update: it forces delegations to hear, in the chair's words, how far apart they are.

The break. Not a rest for the chair, the Presidency adviser or the Commission: the Presidency text gets posted now. Keep it to the skeleton with options struck or added: it needs to exist and to show the fault lines, nothing more. Fire D1 as people return, not while they are away.

Block 2. The article negotiation is the scenario's deep water: fractured, noisy, three rooms and eleven channels. Resist the urge to referee it. Watchpoints: **Article 2 is the real bottleneck:** historically it was too; steer stuck rooms there via the chair. Watch the intra-delegation clocks: if Russia stalls monolithically, a private note to the Gazprom Commercial Director ("your board has called twice") is legitimate facilitation; if Ukraine's public price line produces genuine paralysis, remind the Strategic Adviser they exist to mediate. If member states outsource everything to the Commission, have the chair note that the Commission cannot vote and ask the Council for its position. If the Council converges too fast on a text that says nothing, let them.

In the **endgame plenary,** the chair's first job is triage (Chapter 7.2). Expect the classic pathologies: re-opening settled text; consensus by exhaustion; a big state discovering at 1:36 that it has a veto in practice. Fine, those are all realistic outcomes; note them for the debrief. The vote must be formal, one by one, in role, on the record.

Failure modes, mapped from Volume 1, Chapter 5: deadlock → first do nothing, then D2, then the chair's procedural powers (narrow the agenda to one article, call the vote); premature consensus → surplus time goes to a harder debrief ("what did you trade away to get along?"); a monolithic delegation → a private note to the scripted dissenter, never a public one; comedy collapse → let it run for a while, then have a meta-pause to try to re-calibrate; rules-lawyering on the QMV threshold → rule zero, note it, fix the scenario afterwards; a checked-out participant → route a task through the game (a bilateral request from the chair, an instruction from a capital, a press question).

7.5 Debrief kit

The four-step structure of Volume 1, Chapter 5, applied, with a reveal. Steps 1–3 happen in the session's last fifteen minutes; step 4 opens the next course session, and the written reflection (Chapter 8) carries the rest. If your time constraints ask for different ordering of the tasks, just make sure that you always do decompression right after. Establishing shared reality is better right after the scenario, but can be done through feedback.

1. **Decompression.** The scenario is not very emotional: simple prompt like “what happened from your perspective” is more than enough. Just make sure to frame the round in a way that the participants are addressing the in game reality, not providing technical feedback to you or to other players.

2. **Shared reality (never skip).** Ask the room: what is the outcome: full protocol, partial, sabotaged, nothing, side deals and what it would mean in the world on 8 January 2009: does gas flow tomorrow, and for whom? Then name the bends from Chapter 3: one conference instead of shuttle diplomacy; seven states instead of twenty-seven; the simplified QMV; the Commission's invented vote; thirteen days in ninety minutes. It is fine to comment on the participants' reading of their own text, for example they may believe they have restarted the gas when Article 2 still says "another arrangement"; say so kindly and move on.

3. **The reveal.** Possible, not needed: this scenario carries real hidden information; short examples here can easily reveal “oh, there was more going on”. Reveal Russia's three clocks (state patience, commercial urgency, pipeline opportunism); Ukraine's designed price trap (the government's public ceiling against Naftogaz's private floor); the Commission's vulnerability dataset; Bulgaria's bilateral temptation; the consortium card.

4. **Institutional lessons.** Prepared questions to pose to the room. Pick four to six, and the best outcome is participants taking over after the second one:

- Where did the EU's common position actually come from: shared interest, or the fear of being seen to have none? Where does the real Council behave this way?

- Bulgaria and Slovakia were loudest; Germany was quietest. Who got more of what they wanted, and why? What did the qualified-majority rule do to the small states that a consensus rule would not have?

- What was the technical gas *really* about? (Money is only part of the answer: it was about who owns responsibility for the system.)

- Whom did the crisis strengthen? Compare with your protocol: did your text reward the same actors reality did and did it say anything at all about Nord Stream and South Stream?

- Serbia and Bosnia froze but had no seat. What does the EU owe non-members caught in its energy disputes, how different are their situations?

- The Commission held almost no formal power here. Where did its actual influence come from: and did the threat of its vote matter? (here it is important to balance between “yes, Commission has SOME influence” and “the influence is limited”)

- *(If no agreement:)* which article killed the deal: and who in the room quietly preferred failure?

- *(If agreement:)* what did you trade away to get it signed: and who pays for that concession outside this room?

Historical comparison (read or paraphrase, Appendix B): the real crisis ended on 18–19 January 2009 with a political deal between the two prime ministers and ten-year Gazprom–Naftogaz contracts, European-formula pricing with a 20 % discount for 2009 only. The 2009 transit tariff was unchanged, full European levels from 2010, and RosUkrEnergo was eliminated. The EU's monitoring mission deployed, but mattered less than the bilateral deal. The lasting European consequence came later: Regulation 994/2010: mandatory reverse flows, the N-1 standard, emergency plans. Ask the room: would your protocol have made that regulation unnecessary, or inevitable?

7.6 Variant: in person

The scenario was built for a room as much as for a server, and plays warmer in one. Changes: delegation tables instead of channels (the physical movement between tables is the negotiation: Russia's five should rarely be at their own table); the three negotiation rooms become three corners or side rooms; the shared document becomes a projected document plus printed copies of the skeleton, one per delegation, with the Presidency adviser typing; injects are printed and read aloud by the facilitator from the door: in a room, reading aloud costs less than online and lands harder.

The vote is taken standing, by delegation, and the protocol is physically signed. Materials: printed role handouts (one per participant, handed out individually, never stacked on a table), five copies of the factsheet, eleven copies of the skeleton, table cards with delegation names, a visible clock, a flipchart for the chair's state-of-play. Timing is unchanged.

Chapter 8
Communication templates

Adapt dates, links and names. You might decide to change the text or the homework itself; this is a simple framework to work with.

8.1 Role-assignment email

Subject: Your role for the next scenario: The Cold Winter

Dear [name],

here is your role for next week's simulation: **[role]**, part of the **[delegation]** delegation. The attached handout has two parts: a delegation section that all members of your delegation share, and an individual brief that is yours alone, including a confidential paragraph that you should not share with anyone, *including your own delegation.* Whether and when you reveal it is your decision in the game.

[LINK role handout]

Alongside your handout, read the general factsheet posted in [channel], especially the decision rules and the draft protocol skeleton annexed to it, which is the text you will negotiate. Your delegation channel is open on [platform]; use the week to agree your opening position, your red lines and who covers what. Please do not discuss the scenario with participants outside your delegation.

Two small tasks before the session: rename your profile to your function and set your delegation's flag or institution logo as your avatar (instructions in [channel]).

Best regards, [facilitator]

8.2 Pre-session announcement

@everyone: The Cold Winter is on [date, time].
Rooms open 15 minutes early; please arrive with audio tested, profile renamed, and your delegation's opening position agreed.

The running order: two 45-minute blocks with a 10-minute break, then a short debrief => a little over two hours in total. Re-read the factsheet (the etiquette section especially) and the protocol skeleton. Two rules to remember tonight: nothing is agreed until it is written in the shared text, and no agreement is also an outcome. We start on time with the Presidency's situation report.

8.3 Post-session message and homework

@everyone that was January 2009.

Yours ended [signed / unsigned / with side deals]; the real one ended with a handshake in Moscow on 18 January and ten-year contracts the next day. The full debrief opens our next session on [date]; keep your grievances in role and try to take some insights out of it.

Homework (due [date], max 2 pages total):

1. Compare the real-world resolution of the January 2009 crisis with the protocol negotiated in our simulation (attach or link your text). Who benefits and who loses in each? (½–1 page)
2. What could you have done differently for your delegation? *(a few sentences)*
3. Take your protocol as the real outcome: how does European energy security evolve differently over the next decade? (½–1 page)

AI policy as usual: assistance for editing and research is fine with a one-line disclosure.

Appendices

Appendix A
Example output: a protocol from a live run

Facilitator reference only. A reconstruction, from participants' written reflections, of the protocol produced by a cohort of thirteen in 2026: shown so you know what a possible output looks like, not what a correct one is. Do not show this to participants before the session.

The room signed a full protocol, with the Commission supporting. Its choices: **Article 3** resumption within 24 hours of signature, unconditional; **Article 4:** an interim price of $300 per thousand cubic metres for two years, with a long-term cap of $350, and an EU contribution of $60 per thousand cubic metres paid to Ukraine "for storage and transit quality," reducing Ukraine's effective price to $240: the Commission's financial instrument, spent on the pricing article rather than on technical gas; **Article 5:** debt acknowledged at $1.8 billion, no deadline; **Article 2**: technical gas absorbed into the pricing arrangement.

A **side agreement** read into the record: a trilateral German–Italian–Russian declaration endorsing Nord Stream and South Stream, which Poland did not block at the vote.

Notice what participants did instinctively: they bought the crisis off with EU money on a scale no real Council would have contemplated (their own reflections later priced it at several billion dollars a year), they treated the bypass pipelines as a side question rather than the strategic one, and they solved the technical gas by not mentioning it. Every one of those choices is something to unpack and the cohort's written reflections, comparing their "subsidised stability" with the real world's reverse flows and LNG

terminals, were mostly able to unpack these issues. Also notice that the text is simple, un-lawyerly and not fully coherent/ bulletproof. That is fine for the exercise.

Appendix B — The historical outcome: debrief sheet

Issue	Real JCPOA outcome (2015)
Format	Bilateral Gazprom–Naftogaz contracts brokered politically by the two prime ministers (18 January), signed 19 January, after an EU-brokered monitoring protocol (10–12 January) that deployed but did not restart the gas
Monitoring mission	Independent monitors (Commission, member states, European gas companies) at metering stations on both sides of the border; accepted by both parties; nearly collapsed over Ukraine's handwritten declaration; deployed 12 January
Technical gas	Never solved inside the protocol; the 13 January restart attempt failed over routing and technical gas; resolved only within the bilateral deal

Issue	Real JCPOA outcome (2015)
Resumption	Transit resumed 20 January, thirteen days after the full stop
Price	European netback formula; 20 % discount for 2009 (about $360 in Q1 2009); full European level from 2010; take-or-pay
Transit tariff	Unchanged for 2009; European level from 2010
Intermediary	RosUkrEnergo eliminated; direct contracts
Debt	Settled outside the headline agreement through side transactions; litigated for years afterwards
EU solidarity	Improvised: the Gas Coordination Group, reverse flows and storage releases by member states; no binding mechanism existed
Legislative legacy	Regulation (EU) 994/2010 on security of gas supply: mandatory reverse flows, N-1 standard, national emergency plans; replaced by Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 with a solidarity mechanism; the Third Energy Package adopted July 2009

Issue	Real JCPOA outcome (2015)
Bypass pipelines	Nord Stream commissioned 2011–2012; South Stream abandoned 2014; the Ukrainian transit route shrank and ended with the expiry of the last transit contract at the end of 2024

Appendix C — Facts versus game design

The register boundary (Volume 1, Chapter 2), so that you never present an invented number as fact.

Historically grounded (register 1; sources in Appendix D): the $179.50 price for 2008; Gazprom's $250 offer and post-cut-off demands of $418 and $450; Ukraine's $201–235 counter-offers; the roughly $2 billion debt claim, of which a little over $600 million in disputed penalties after Naftogaz's $1.5 billion payment; ~80 % of Russian gas to the EU transiting Ukraine, ~300 million cubic metres a day; ~21 million cubic metres a day of technical gas; Bulgaria's ~96 % dependency and days of storage; Slovakia's state of emergency and the Bohunice order; Bulgaria's Kozloduy request; the RosUkrEnergo intermediary and its elimination; the handwritten declaration; the failed Sudzha restart; the consortium idea; Stockholm arbitration; the 20 % discount for 2009.

Game design (register 3; invented for playability, flagged so you never present them as fact): the Council's simplified qualified majority; the Commission's support/sabotage vote and its one-article financial instrument; the internal majorities inside Russia and Ukraine; Slovakia's €500 million compensation demand; the Czech Republic's "~40 days of storage";

Germany's "60 % storage / 5–10 million cubic metres a day" gesture numbers; Austrian banking exposure to RosUkrEnergo (Russia's debt adviser's pressure card); Revithoussa spare-capacity claims (Bulgaria's adviser); Ukraine's "50/50" arbitration odds; the Commission's per-country vulnerability dataset in its rounded form; the delegations' price floors and ceilings as stated in the role handouts.

Appendix D — Sources and further reading

Background sources for Chapter 3 and the injects (register 1; consult before answering participant questions with confidence):

- Simon Pirani, Jonathan Stern and Katja Yafimava, *The Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2009: a comprehensive assessment*, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, NG 27 (February 2009). The definitive account, with the day-by-day chronology and the contract terms; recommended to participants after the session.

- Aleksandar Kovacevic, *The impact of the Russia–Ukraine gas crisis in South Eastern Europe*, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, NG 29 (March 2009). The humanitarian and economic effects behind inject D1.

- European Commission, *The January 2009 gas supply disruption to the EU: an assessment,* Commission staff working document accompanying the proposal for the security-of-gas-supply regulation, SEC(2009) 977 (July 2009). The EU's own reading of what failed and why.

- Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply, and its successor Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. The legislative legacy.

- Directive 2009/73/EC and Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 (the Third Energy Package, gas). What the Commission players are directionally trying to get to..

- Jonathan Stern, *The Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis of January 2006*, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (2006). The prequel, for facilitators who want the origin of the intermediary structure.

- emergency in Slovakia, the Bohunice and Kozloduy announcements, the Sarajevo heating cut, the consortium proposal.

- The Pirate Academy was made possible by the Greens/EFA group in the European Parliament.

EUROPEAN PIRATE
ACADEMY

THE**GREENS/EFA**
in the **European Parliament**

The Pirate Academy was made possible by the Greens/EFA group in the European Parliament.