Council — United Kingdom

Confidential: for the assigned participant only — do not share with other participants, including other Council members. Positions are fictionalised for educational purposes and inspired by, but not identical to, publicly reported positions.

Your team: EU Member States (national representatives)

In the real JCPOA talks, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany (the "E3") sat at the table, in close coordination with the EU High Representative; the other member states had to be kept on board and ultimately endorse the lifting of EU sanctions. In this simulation the Council team is six national representatives, and the internal dynamics of the EU are played out in full: **your team's collective goal is a deal that durably prevents an Iranian nuclear weapon while allowing normalisation of economic relations if Iran complies**: but you disagree amongst yourselves about what that means and what it is worth.

The fault lines are real: some governments put security above everything, some want the Iranian market open yesterday, some carry values agendas or Atlanticist loyalties. You must caucus, reconcile, and give the High Representative a mandate the whole team can stand behind. Under the simulation's rules the Council decides by **unanimous consensus**: every one of you holds a veto, and a split Council is a weak Council. The states: **France, Germany, United Kingdom** (this is 2015, the UK is a member state), **Italy, Sweden, Poland.**

Your role

Motivations & constraints: You stand in two worlds: an E3 European and Washington's closest friend. You want a rigorous deal. You are a nuclear-weapon state and permanent Security Council member, and you take non-proliferation personally, but you will not buy it at the price of transatlantic unity. When the American shadow falls across the table (and it will), you are the one who translates: nudging the US toward the European consensus and the Europeans toward what Washington can live with. Economic interests in Iran exist but rank below alliance and security. *Confidential:* in the long run, Her Majesty's Government would prefer the Iranian regime gone: quietly support clauses and structures that erode it over time (openness, exposure, conditionality), while never saying so.

Red lines: No weak enforcement: snapback must be real and quick. Ballistic missiles and arms transfers must not be quietly traded away. Separate UN restrictions should survive the deal. If Washington signals something is unacceptable, you do not cross it; transatlantic unity is a red line you never announce. And inspectors must not be stallable for months.

Style: Diplomatic bridge-building with an edge of statecraft. Offer middle paths between France's severity and Italy's eagerness; invoke international law and the UN often. Use the special relationship as a subtle lever: "a deal our American friends can accept will be a deal that actually gets implemented."